Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/16/2014 17:36 -0500
Following the stunning announcement in January 2013 that the Bundesbank would repatriate 674 tons of gold from the NY Fed and the French Central Bank, a year later the Bundesbank followed up with a just as stunning revelation that of the 84 tons the bank was supposed to bring back home, it had managed to obtain just a paltry 37 tons, with only 5 tons originating from the NY Fed.
The reason given for this disappointing amount was as follows:
The Bundesbank explained [the low amount of US gold] by saying that the transports from Paris are simpler and therefore were able to start quickly.” Additionally, the Bundesbank had the “support” of the BIS “which has organized more gold shifts already for other central banks and has appropriate experience – only after months of preparation and safety could transports start with truck and plane.” That would be the same BIS that in 2011 lent out a record 632 tons of gold…
Going back to the main explanation, we wonder: how exactly is a gold transport “simpler” because it originates in Paris and not in New York? Or does the NY Fed gold travel by car along the bottom of the Atlantic, and is French gold transported by a Vespa scooter out of the country?
Supposedly, there was another reason: “The bullion stored in Paris already has the elongated shape with beveled edges of the “London Good Delivery” standard. The bars in the basement of the Fed on the other hand have a previously common form. They will need to be remelted [to LGD standard]. And the capacity of smelters are just limited.”
Or, simply said, generic pretexts for a failure to follow through with the Bundesbank’s original intention of redomiciling physical gold, especially after Zero Hedge posted in November 2012 proof of collusion between the 1968 Bank of England and the Fed seeking to defraud Deutsche Bank: ‘Bank Of England To The Fed: “No Indication Should, Of Course, Be Given To The Bundesbank…”
The charade ended with a thud in June of this year, when instead of continuing the farce, Germany simply gave up, providing an even more laughable reason why it can no longer even pretend to collect its physical gold located at New York’s 9 Liberty Street.
Germany has decided its gold is safe in American hands. “The Americans are taking good care of our gold,” Norbert Barthle, the budget spokesman for Merkel’s Christian Democratic bloc in parliament, said in an interview. “Objectively, there’s absolutely no reason for mistrust.”
And that was it: not a single word more from Germany on the topic of its failed gold repatriation initiative. Until this week, when Deutsche Bank – the bank which is Germany’s equivalent to America’ Goldman Sachs in terms of policy decision-making – once again revealed just what the true reason behind the failure of Germany’s attempt to bring its gold back. From Robin Winkler’s special report:
… the gold community paid great attention to the decision of the German Bundesbank to “bring German gold home”. At the beginning of 2013, the Bundesbank announced it would repatriate 300 tonnes of gold stored in the US by 2020. It is well behind schedule, citing logistical difficulties. Yet diplomatic difficulties are more likely to be the chief cause of the delay, especially seeing as the Bundesbank has proven its capacity to organise large-scale gold transports. In the early 2000s, the Bundesbank incrementally repatriated 930 tonnes of German gold held by the Bank of England.
Because if anyone knows what really happened behind the scenes in Germany, and inside closed doors at the Bundesbank, it is Deutsche Bank.
And there you have it: it wasn’t transportation, or “good delivery standards” concerns, or anything remotely related to Germany “decididng its gold is safe in American hands”, but just the opposite: Germany was pressured to keep its gold in the US after a “diplomatic” line of communication was opened, most likely the result of the Fed making it all too clear clear to the Bundesbank not only who runs the show, but what the assured failure to repatriate Germany’s gold would mean for “price stability.”
Which has, for now at least, ended Germany’s gold repatriation demands.
Now the question is, just how will the US pressure the Swiss “diplomatically” to make sure its own gold repatriation referendum does not succeed. Because if Germany failed miserably to obtain 674 tons of gold in 2013, it is assured that Switzerland will find absolutely nothing in its quest to obtain more than double, or 1,500 tons, of gold as a successful November 30 referendum outcome would require.
Then again, considering it was Obama’s action that destroyed the Swiss banking sector after the US crushed the centuries-long tradition of “Swiss banking anonymity”, this could be just the right action with which “neutral” Switzerland could finally take its revenge on the regime that cost it what was for centuries the primary source of capital inflow into the small and so very prosperous (until then) central-European nation.